3 Although real estate investment trusts (REITs) have long preceded what is generally known as shadow banking, I refer to them because they are, technically, SPEs that issue securities and use the proceeds to invest in real estate properties. 4 ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, Abstract to SHADOW BANKING (2010). 5 Id. at 4-5. 6 See Philip Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:17 AM) , http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/uk-regulation-shadowbanking-idUSLNE7BJ00T20111220 (indicating that the shadow banking sector is a $60 trillion industry). 7 See, e.g., Klara Bakk-Simon et al., Shadow Banking in the Euro Area, European Central Bank Occasional Paper No. 133, at 4 (Apr. 2012 ) (observing that disintermediation is "one of the main sources of financial stability concerns"). 8 See infra Part IV.C (discussing responsibility failure). See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 206 (2008). efficiency. 9 The challenge will be to determine how shadow banking should be regulated to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its risks.
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B. HOW WILL SHADOW BANKING IMPACT THE REAL ESTATE SECTOR?
Securitization, hedge funds, and REITs are especially relevant to the real estate sector.
1. Securitization is important both to the housing recovery and to commercial real estate generally, because it is a critical means of enabling mortgage-loan originators to regain liquidity to make new loans (which I will discuss as a means of "funding regeneration" 11 ). A common political response to the recent financial crisis, however, has been to restrict securitization. in the recent financial crisis (when the rising housing market collapsed, many of these loans likewise became undercollateralized). In both cases, observers critically under-appreciated the systemic consequences of a precipitous drop-unprecedented in then-recent history-in collateral value.
(ii) We also have short memories. Although in late 2008/early 2009, no investor would buy anything that did not have a government guarantee, there is a trend in today's financial markets toward increasing tolerance for risk. To obtain higher returns, investors-especially hedge funds-are now buying AAA/Aaa subprime auto and A-rated prime auto paper and are looking at other asset classes. We now appear to have a vibrant CLO market for non-mortgage asset classes (which looks in all respects like the old CDO market with just a different name). 24 Even CMBS is improving, though RMBS is still uncertain.
25
Short memories, however, may not fully explain risk cycles and today's market's increasing tolerance for risk. Other explanations might include a swing back to normalcy from the earlier overreaction, and a competitive need of investors to get high returns. 1. Shadow banking also makes it much more likely that market participants will engage in profitable but risky transactions, although doing so could externalize harm-including systemic harm-onto other market participants and even ordinary citizens. Economists would see this as fitting into the traditional market-failure category of "externalities."
2. "Externalities," however, is a counterintuitive and confusing term for a market-failure category because it conflates cause and effect.
Externalities are consequences, not causes, of market failure. We need to focus more on the cause of those externalities, which I will call responsibility failure. 31 This is not an overlap with agency failure because agency failure goes to the principalagent relationship whereas conflicts resulting from limited liability go to the conflict between managers of firms and society.
by their primary investors. Because they typically divide up a significant share of the firm's profits, those managers have strong incentives to take risks that could generate large profits. Yet if a risky action exposes their firm to significant liability for externalized harm, those managers would not be liable if the firm cannot pay that liability. They therefore have an incentive to take outsized risks with their firms, for the chance of outsized gains to themselves, notwithstanding the potential systemic impact that could result from their firm's failure. 5. This is radically unlike the management incentives in large firms, such as traditional banks, in which the senior managers tend to share only indirectly in profits, such as through stock options. Those managers may also be more invested in maintaining their jobs. They therefore are less motivated to take actions that risk the firm.
